Had a good discussion this weekend with the Chalice Coven this weekend re: the first principle—“the inherent worth and dignity of every person.”
(I’m normally wary of “let’s talk about the principles” discussions; they seem to carry a tacit assumption that we somehow “believe” them and move on from there to what feels like an evangelical bible study. But no matter. This one was good.)
Usually the phrase is run together: inherentworthanddignity… But someone made a distinction between the two. Inherent worth is what we have as a god given right. We are born with it, and no one can take it away, no matter how they try. Inherent dignity is what we are due from others, and no one has the right to take it away, no matter what we have done.
I want to point out how relational this reading of inherent dignity makes our most individualistic principle. We too often read it as, “I am a special little snowflake, dammit, and I have the right to be told so via an important religious document of my choosing.” But, well, who besides the snowflake cares?1
When we view inherent dignity as something that only happens when you and I give it to each other, then we have started doing ethics—and an ethics with a deep spirituality behind it at that. We are called to affirm, then, not just our own inherent snowflakeness but also the profound dignity we owe it to give each other. Namaste, indeed.
As an aside, I seemed to score some points on the Hitler front. Let me make that more clear. We talked about how evil is real and how some people are really, that is, truly, evil. I argued that we must say that even Hitler retained his inherent worth because the cost of not saying so is too much. Once we have removed inherent worth from someone, we can do the same to someone else, and that seems exactly like the sort of thing Hitler was about. And so we are back to inherent dignity.
- Answer: the snowflake’s mother. [↩]
Too bad I was otherwise engaged; sounds like an interesting discussion.
I think I would have taken the completely opposite tack. I would say that inherent worth and dignity are things that exist only because we ASSERT them, that we agree to act AS IF they are true, even though they’re NOT.
In fact, I would argue, rather than having equal inherent worth, that every person is equally worthless. Perhaps that’s same same, and I suppose the Buddha would tell us “neither worth nor worthless, nor worth and worthless, nor not worth and not worthless, etc.” But I don’t think we can prove, observe, or reason to any inherent rights whatsoever. Rights are only those things that, when violated, produce a moral outrage in us, and thus are defined precisely by the things that CAN be taken away from us, not those that CANNOT.
At the heart of our moral instinct, I suspect, is a genetically-based sense of reciprocity that makes our elaborate social systems possible. Other primates have it as well, a sense of what’s “fair.” In fact, it reminds me of what Mark Twain once said: “Man is the only animal that blushes…or needs to.” Primates, and humans in particular, are liars, cheats, and gamesmen from the time they first learn to talk (and perhaps before). We need a finely-tuned sense of cheats and suckers just to survive one another.
Much of the rest of our moral calculus involves figuring out what I owe to others and what others owe to me. “Owe,” in this sense, is just that sense of moral obligation or outrage that derives from reciprocity, as well as what I reckon I can get others in the community to back me up on.
And so I come back to my feeling that the first principle is an agreement that we will all act AS IF every person has inherent worth and dignity. Some people believe that without a god there can be no rights, and they’re correct. There is no god and there are no rights. But we, as rational and compassionate people, can act as if there are, regardless of whether any diety forces us to. To me, that is a much more comforting thought, because while I may or may not be able to prove the existence of a god, I can count 100% on the self interest of other human beings.
Maybe that sounds cyncial, but I don’t feel that at all. In fact, it’s a very optimistic statement about the ability of human beings to treat one another with respect and kindness without the goads of fear and guilt.
this post helped me yesterday, chutney. thanks :)
What I wanted to bring up at the meeting but was too far gone on pain and pain meds was that the principles don’t just say “we believe in…” They say we “covenant to affirm and promote…” So pretty much exactly what Kermit said in his penultimate paragraph. It’s not just a matter of “we believe this to be true.” We’re agreeing to act on this belief, and further to get other people to believe and act on this belief as well. That’s what promote means (in this context.) UU evangelism indeed. Those words are important. We covenant to affirm and promote. We enter into formal, solemn agreement to express dedication to these beliefs, and furthermore to contribute to the growth and prosperity of these beliefs.
Mind you, this might have been the “evangelical bible study” Chutney was afraid would happen. Besides, it can be its own discussion once we’re finished dissecting the other principles. ;)
I might say more later. These daily thunderstorms have been taking it out of me.
Why be afraid to say we believe something?
Why would I have to prove that something has an objective and material existence before I believe in it?
What is the big boogie monster that makes us cling to only things we can prove and only things that are materially observe, measure, and demonstrate?
If not through observation, experience, or reasoning, then by what methods would you suggest we evaluate the truth of a proposition?
Sense experience and reasoning are hardly foolproof, but I’m more willing to rely on them than I am on wishing, hoping, and feeling. The former methods at least give me somewhat reliable information on the fact of the matter; the latter methods have no bearing on it whatsoever. You may be capable of believing any old thing you like, but I am not.
With “inherent worth and dignity” this is particularly tricky. It is an assertion with moral weight. Presumably, we are not saying “Every person has inherent worth and dignity…so there you go!” Nor are we saying “Every person has inherent worth and dignity…so rape, loot, and pillage to your heart’s content.” No, asserting the inherent worth and dignity of all people *implies* moral obligations that follow logically from it. That’s how we’re built as a species.
But if you base the moral obligation on the premise of inherent worth and dignity AND you can’t PROVE the premise THEN it’s possible to reject the moral obligation as well if you reject the premise. But we WANT people to act morally, or at least I do. So what I’m saying is, regardless of whether we can PROVE that inherent worth and dignity exist (I think they don’t) we should ACT as if they do. I hate to echo Kant, but there you go.
I don’t really care if you believe in the inherent worth and dignity of all. I sure as heck DO care if you act like you do. Put another way, I would like you to treat me as having worth and dignity even though I am nothing but a big water-filled meat baloon. And so I’m more comfortable saying that these qualities exist because we assert them (“I claim this land for Spain!”) than by trying to convince someone that they have objective validity.
I think your stance is entirely contradictory and illogical (no offense ;)). You are very concerned about morality, but not at all concerned about the content of people’s internal lives. But morality is entirely based on concern for people’s subjective (and largely unverifiable) experiences of pain, hope, desire, and belief.
The basis of all moral argument is a belief in our connectedness. If you do not belief that we are somehow connected, then the only thing you can appeal to is rational self-preservation.
But the strange thing is, you don’t have to prove to most people that they ought to be moral. They know it already. Most people do not wait for philosphers to finish their arguments before they decide how to behave.
What’s more interesting than what we can prove with reason and science is the way we can experience a world full of meaning. And we don’t have to prove that this meaning is “out there” to experience it. The meaning is built into us, probably by our biology, but who cares where it comes from? What’s more interesting is learning to live a life that honors that meaning, which means that we find truth not just outside ourselves in the material world, but inside of ourselves in the inherent structure of our minds and what we care about.
I find it interesting that many rationalists care deeply about other people also being rational. Why care, except that in rationality we see justice, truth, hope – i.e. the experience of meaning?
Kermit, you are so Richard Rorty. He makes exactly that argument in “Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.”
I’m still rather influenced by Wesley’s “quadrilateral.” Briefly, he says that we have to balance ourselves by looking at Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience. We can probably UU-ize these by making them plural. The “Sources of the Living Tradition” in the Purposes & Principles pretty much do that.
CK also touched on this recently from a different direction in “Help! I’m being reduced.” The gist of it is that we have to take into consideration someone’s own description of their religious experiences and assume they are not crazy or misled. To do less is uncharitable, which is to say unethical.
Mary Midgley also touches on these questions. She frequently accuses popular science types of reductionism, which for her means trying to make human questions into a single rationality or line of reasoning. But we pack animals are more complex than that. She draws pretty heavily on Aristotle’s four causes, though she’s not stuck on them. Pop materialists prefer to ignore formal and final causes. (And reciprocal causes, a fifth cause?)
I’m veering off topic now, and I’m not accusing you of being a reductionist. I agree with you on the metaphysics, anatta and all that, but we cannot retreat to metaphysics. The Taoist in me wants to say that metaphysical questions are ultimately unanswerable, even the Buddha’s.
We humans are pack animals that are troubled by belonging to multiple, overlapping, and competing packs. We are “rational dependent animals,” as Alistair MacIntyre has argued. Which is to say that both you and Louis are right, in different spheres.
Sorry for all the philosophical name dropping. This discussion is helping me synthesize some reading.
“I think your stance is entirely contradictory and illogical (no offense).”
So now I’m taking lessons in logic from someone who cries “Why do I have to prove something to believe it?” You can believe whatever you like, based on whatever criteria you like, but don’t pretend it’s logical. My position is entirely consistent: I don’t think you can prove that people have inherent worth and dignity, therefore I’d rather not rely on that to motivate people’s behavior. I’d rather say, “Whether or not people have inherent worth and dignity, let’s act like they do, because that’s the kind of world we’d like to live in.” Not only is that logical and consistent, it’s also intellectually honest.
“You are very concerned about morality, but not at all concerned about the content of people’s internal lives.”
Right. I don’t care if you don’t steal from me because you love me or because you’re scared of me. Just don’t steal from me.
“But morality is entirely based on concern for people’s subjective (and largely unverifiable) experiences of pain, hope, desire, and belief.”
Why do you say that?
“The basis of all moral argument is a belief in our connectedness.”
Why do you say that?
“If you do not belief that we are somehow connected, then the only thing you can appeal to is rational self-preservation.”
And what would be wrong with that? Which is more reliable in predicting human behavior: a persons’s self interests or some vague feeling of connectedness? Given my preference, I’d get to know someone and make my best guess based on what I know of their past behavior – oh, but that would be observation and reasoning, so that wouldn’t be
valid to your way of thinking. So if you’re going to leave me the choice to rely on some feeling of onnectedness or to rely on another’s self interest, I’ll place my bets on self interest every time.
“But the strange thing is, you don’t have to prove to most people that they ought to be moral. They know it already. Most people do not wait for philosphers to finish their arguments before they decide how to behave.”
Do we live in the same world? The one with hundreds of thousands of years of human history featuring murder, rape, theft, and naked acts of pure greed? Not to mention long traditions in religion, law, epistimology, and ethics trying to puzzle out what you evidently think is second nature? I do agree that we probably have a built-in sense of justice or reciprocity, which I suspect is the basis for all other moral inferences. But I’m not relying on that to produce good behavior. It obviously doesn’t.
“What’s more interesting than what we can prove with reason and science is the way we can experience a world full of meaning. And we don’t have to prove that this meaning is “out there†to experience it. The meaning
is built into us, probably by our biology, but who cares where it comes from?”
I’m not sure whether we are agreeing or disagreeing here. I agree we grant meaning to the world, some of which is not based on anything objective. Taxonomy comes to mind, when it’s based on features we think are important (edible v/s inedible; where you can find them; the kind of hooves they have; etc). And I would assert that we can act AS
IF a given proposition is true, even if there’s no way we can independently verify it, and that doing so is quite often the only practical way to navigate the world. But at the same time, I’m not inclined to fool myself into thinking such propositions are true when they are only PROBABLY true – or convenient fictions.
“What’s more interesting is learning to live a life that honors that meaning, which means that we find truth not just outside ourselves in the material world, but inside of ourselves in the inherent structure of our minds and what we care about.”
I confess I have no idea what you’re talking about here. However, I’m skeptical of the value of relying on notions my mind presents without testing them out in some way, mainly because I’ve learned that not only the senses, but also the inferences and assumptions we carry around in our heads, can be wrong. There’s a lot of things we believe just becasue we believe them, but I don’t think that’s a very reliable way to get a true picture of the world that you can then act upon. I guess you could say the inherent structure of my mind is to question the inherent structure of my mind.
“I find it interesting that many rationalists care deeply about other people also being rational. Why care, except that in rationality we see justice, truth, hope – i.e. the experience of meaning?”
I don’t know whether I would call myself a rationalist, but I’d say the value of others acting rationally is that their behavior becomes more predictable and reliable. That makes my life easier.
And Chutney, I had composed this answer before I saw your piece. Maybe some things in there I’d want to respond to, but I’ll have to take a look. At the very least, I’m glad you’re not trying to label anyone “reductionist,” mainly because I think that term is just another way of saying “I don’t like what you have to say.” Which would be a pathetic way to argue a point.
First of all, even if I do not I rely on logic in my personal belief system does not mean that I am not a skilled logician. I don’t claim to be better than you or Chutney, but I have reason to believe my ability to reason inferentially is quite solid.
Here’s the center of my question (I admit that maybe I am not understanding what you are saying):
Do you care about harm done to other people who are not yourself, and if so why?
I admit that I have been presuming that you care about harm not just to yourself, but to people generally. I apologize for this presumption.
It seems to me to be a logical contradiciton to be concerned about moral action without being concerned about the subjects whom the moral or immoral action is happening to.
In mathematics, you cannot prove anything unless you start with axioms. In morality, you cannot prove what action is right or wrong without some assumption about what is good or what is evil.
Perhaps we need a new term for personal rules for action that have no reference to good or evil content. I would not use the term “morality” for this, since my understanding of the common usage of the term “morality” implies a concern for good or evil outcomes. But I am not the linguist among us, so I am prepared to be corrected…
At the very least, I’m glad you’re not trying to label anyone “reductionist,†mainly because I think that term is just another way of saying “I don’t like what you have to say.†Which would be a pathetic way to argue a point.
Well, except when someone is being reductionist.
L-
Mostly my interest in the moral behavior of others is in what they may or may not try to do to me. I care about the harm done to others in so much as it makes me feel bad to think about or witness it. I presume it makes me feel bad principly because of some empathetic sensibility that evolved in our very social species – a product of the kind of natural selection that made sex feel pleasurable and hunger painful.
Interestingly, my empathetic system has picked up a “hitchhiker” that I doubt provides much adaptive advantage: I also am uncomfortable with the suffering of animals, and I have consequently been a vegetarian for some time. This isn’t really a rational decision, except in the sense that I usually avoid things that make me feel bad. But although I *feel* subjectively that eating animals is a bad thing to do, I don’t really think there is an objective quality about it that could be called “right” or “wrong.”
I don’t know if that distinction is clear or not, and I’m not sure I’d be able to explain it any more clearly in this sort of forum, so I’m inclined to let this discussion go.
C–
Yes, of course. But I’ve heard “reductionist” thrown around about as often I’ve heard “fascist” and “communist” and “liberal” used in discussions, with about as much correspondance to the defintion of the actual word, which is to say little at all. In my estimation, it’s too often used to criticize any attempt to understand and explain behavior.