(Responding to Daniel’s comments.)

One of the things that panentheism implies is that the processes of life, the universe and everything (somehow) mirror (darkly) the processes of god. Under panentheism, to approach the ways of god you should approach the ways of nature.

The distinction is one of models. Claiming panentheism is a claim against other models for god-talk. The models of god-talk we’ve considered with Walter Wink vary in how they relate god to nature, heaven to earth.

So panentheism is a claim against god/heaven being over-and-above nature/earth. Conceptions of ethics-as-moral-law depend upon the theistic model; even if they do not claim a god, these models all claim a god’s-eye-view. Same difference. Since ethics-as-moral-law depends upon a theistic model, panentheism must deny ethics-as-moral-law.

Deontology, or duty-based ethics, could depend upon either a theistic model or a materialist model. If materialist, the idea is that we have no one to depend upon but ourselves and we must recognize some duties as moral imperatives for the good of the order. These duties must always be performed–even at cost to the individual. Utilitarianism is similarly materialistic, except the focus has moved from the duties themsevles to the maximization of good for the whole.

I’m not sure what a pantheistic/animistic/monistic ethics looks like. (Perhaps someone could help me out here.) If it is the material universe that is being deified, it seems we have an exclusively mystical position with little to contribute ethically. If life is being deified, then anything that furthers life is good and anything that hinders life is bad. That sounds nice enough, but in practice it would seem to be either very violent or culturally conservative.

So we’re left then with panentheism, with perhaps a metaphorical polytheism like we get in Hinduism and some forms of Wicca, if that floats your boat. But why virtue ethics?

The virtues mirror a polytheistic pantheon. Temperance, honor, fidelity are all gods in their own right. So are strife, sloth, and greed. We name (through narratives, mostly) some as good, others as bad. Our favorites we take special care to cultivate. Those we hate we take special care to ward off. But we recognize the place of all, however reluctantly.

But more than that. As we began, panentheism is a claim that to observe the universe is to see go–as in a mirror darkly. There can’t be a one to one correlation–that would be pantheism, which would rob us of any moral urgency. But we can describe processes and things in the universe and imagine the virtues that corresond. For the virtues of place, we may imagine virtues of the plains and of the delta. Some of the virtues of the plains would not be appropriate in the delta. Delta folk may find the virtues of the plains folks to be too dry, too stark, and too belabored. And the plains folk may find the delta virtues to be too humid, too overgrown, and too easy. (And some virtues–no matter where they come from–are small and jealous, and want you to stay home with them for fear you’ll meet their betters.)

Better is the person who can incorporate both the virtues of the plains and the virtues of the plains, using each as needed. This person is more likely to pick up quickly the virtues of the forest when she ventures there. But there is always a place, and knowing the different virtues is not the same as knowing when to call upon them.