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Mostly my interest in the moral behavior of others is in what they may or may not try to do to me. I care about the harm done to others in so much as it makes me feel bad to think about or witness it. I presume it makes me feel bad principly because of some empathetic sensibility that evolved in our very social species – a product of the kind of natural selection that made sex feel pleasurable and hunger painful.
Interestingly, my empathetic system has picked up a “hitchhiker” that I doubt provides much adaptive advantage: I also am uncomfortable with the suffering of animals, and I have consequently been a vegetarian for some time. This isn’t really a rational decision, except in the sense that I usually avoid things that make me feel bad. But although I *feel* subjectively that eating animals is a bad thing to do, I don’t really think there is an objective quality about it that could be called “right” or “wrong.”
I don’t know if that distinction is clear or not, and I’m not sure I’d be able to explain it any more clearly in this sort of forum, so I’m inclined to let this discussion go.
C–
Yes, of course. But I’ve heard “reductionist” thrown around about as often I’ve heard “fascist” and “communist” and “liberal” used in discussions, with about as much correspondance to the defintion of the actual word, which is to say little at all. In my estimation, it’s too often used to criticize any attempt to understand and explain behavior.
re not trying to label anyone “reductionist,†mainly because I think that term is just another way of saying “I donâ€
t like what you have to say.†Which would be a pathetic way to argue a point.</em>
Well, except when someone is being reductionist.]]>Well, except when someone is being reductionist.
]]>Here’s the center of my question (I admit that maybe I am not understanding what you are saying):
Do you care about harm done to other people who are not yourself, and if so why?
I admit that I have been presuming that you care about harm not just to yourself, but to people generally. I apologize for this presumption.
It seems to me to be a logical contradiciton to be concerned about moral action without being concerned about the subjects whom the moral or immoral action is happening to.
In mathematics, you cannot prove anything unless you start with axioms. In morality, you cannot prove what action is right or wrong without some assumption about what is good or what is evil.
Perhaps we need a new term for personal rules for action that have no reference to good or evil content. I would not use the term “morality” for this, since my understanding of the common usage of the term “morality” implies a concern for good or evil outcomes. But I am not the linguist among us, so I am prepared to be corrected…
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s subjective (and largely unverifiable) experiences of pain, hope, desire, and belief."
Why do you say that?
"The basis of all moral argument is a belief in our connectedness."
Why do you say that?
"If you do not belief that we are somehow connected, then the only thing you can appeal to is rational self-preservation."
And what would be wrong with that? Which is more reliable in predicting human behavior: a persons's self interests or some vague feeling of connectedness? Given my preference, I'd get to know someone and make my best guess based on what I know of their past behavior - oh, but that would be observation and reasoning, so that wouldn't be
valid to your way of thinking. So if you're going to leave me the choice to rely on some feeling of onnectedness or to rely on another's self interest, I'll place my bets on self interest every time.
"But the strange thing is, you donâ€
t have to prove to most people that they ought to be moral. They know it already. Most people do not wait for philosphers to finish their arguments before they decide how to behave."
Do we live in the same world? The one with hundreds of thousands of years of human history featuring murder, rape, theft, and naked acts of pure greed? Not to mention long traditions in religion, law, epistimology, and ethics trying to puzzle out what you evidently think is second nature? I do agree that we probably have a built-in sense of justice or reciprocity, which I suspect is the basis for all other moral inferences. But I'm not relying on that to produce good behavior. It obviously doesn't.
"Whatâ€
s more interesting than what we can prove with reason and science is the way we can experience a world full of meaning. And we donâ€
t have to prove that this meaning is “out there†to experience it. The meaning
is built into us, probably by our biology, but who cares where it comes from?"
I'm not sure whether we are agreeing or disagreeing here. I agree we grant meaning to the world, some of which is not based on anything objective. Taxonomy comes to mind, when it's based on features we think are important (edible v/s inedible; where you can find them; the kind of hooves they have; etc). And I would assert that we can act AS
IF a given proposition is true, even if there's no way we can independently verify it, and that doing so is quite often the only practical way to navigate the world. But at the same time, I'm not inclined to fool myself into thinking such propositions are true when they are only PROBABLY true - or convenient fictions.
"Whatâ€
s more interesting is learning to live a life that honors that meaning, which means that we find truth not just outside ourselves in the material world, but inside of ourselves in the inherent structure of our minds and what we care about."
I confess I have no idea what you're talking about here. However, I'm skeptical of the value of relying on notions my mind presents without testing them out in some way, mainly because I've learned that not only the senses, but also the inferences and assumptions we carry around in our heads, can be wrong. There's a lot of things we believe just becasue we believe them, but I don't think that's a very reliable way to get a true picture of the world that you can then act upon. I guess you could say the inherent structure of my mind is to question the inherent structure of my mind.
"I find it interesting that many rationalists care deeply about other people also being rational. Why care, except that in rationality we see justice, truth, hope - i.e. the experience of meaning?"
I don't know whether I would call myself a rationalist, but I'd say the value of others acting rationally is that their behavior becomes more predictable and reliable. That makes my life easier.
And Chutney, I had composed this answer before I saw your piece. Maybe some things in there I'd want to respond to, but I'll have to take a look. At the very least, I'm glad you're not trying to label anyone "reductionist," mainly because I think that term is just another way of saying "I don't like what you have to say." Which would be a pathetic way to argue a point.]]>So now I’m taking lessons in logic from someone who cries “Why do I have to prove something to believe it?” You can believe whatever you like, based on whatever criteria you like, but don’t pretend it’s logical. My position is entirely consistent: I don’t think you can prove that people have inherent worth and dignity, therefore I’d rather not rely on that to motivate people’s behavior. I’d rather say, “Whether or not people have inherent worth and dignity, let’s act like they do, because that’s the kind of world we’d like to live in.” Not only is that logical and consistent, it’s also intellectually honest.
“You are very concerned about morality, but not at all concerned about the content of people’s internal lives.”
Right. I don’t care if you don’t steal from me because you love me or because you’re scared of me. Just don’t steal from me.
“But morality is entirely based on concern for people’s subjective (and largely unverifiable) experiences of pain, hope, desire, and belief.”
Why do you say that?
“The basis of all moral argument is a belief in our connectedness.”
Why do you say that?
“If you do not belief that we are somehow connected, then the only thing you can appeal to is rational self-preservation.”
And what would be wrong with that? Which is more reliable in predicting human behavior: a persons’s self interests or some vague feeling of connectedness? Given my preference, I’d get to know someone and make my best guess based on what I know of their past behavior – oh, but that would be observation and reasoning, so that wouldn’t be
valid to your way of thinking. So if you’re going to leave me the choice to rely on some feeling of onnectedness or to rely on another’s self interest, I’ll place my bets on self interest every time.
“But the strange thing is, you don’t have to prove to most people that they ought to be moral. They know it already. Most people do not wait for philosphers to finish their arguments before they decide how to behave.”
Do we live in the same world? The one with hundreds of thousands of years of human history featuring murder, rape, theft, and naked acts of pure greed? Not to mention long traditions in religion, law, epistimology, and ethics trying to puzzle out what you evidently think is second nature? I do agree that we probably have a built-in sense of justice or reciprocity, which I suspect is the basis for all other moral inferences. But I’m not relying on that to produce good behavior. It obviously doesn’t.
“What’s more interesting than what we can prove with reason and science is the way we can experience a world full of meaning. And we don’t have to prove that this meaning is “out there†to experience it. The meaning
is built into us, probably by our biology, but who cares where it comes from?”
I’m not sure whether we are agreeing or disagreeing here. I agree we grant meaning to the world, some of which is not based on anything objective. Taxonomy comes to mind, when it’s based on features we think are important (edible v/s inedible; where you can find them; the kind of hooves they have; etc). And I would assert that we can act AS
IF a given proposition is true, even if there’s no way we can independently verify it, and that doing so is quite often the only practical way to navigate the world. But at the same time, I’m not inclined to fool myself into thinking such propositions are true when they are only PROBABLY true – or convenient fictions.
“What’s more interesting is learning to live a life that honors that meaning, which means that we find truth not just outside ourselves in the material world, but inside of ourselves in the inherent structure of our minds and what we care about.”
I confess I have no idea what you’re talking about here. However, I’m skeptical of the value of relying on notions my mind presents without testing them out in some way, mainly because I’ve learned that not only the senses, but also the inferences and assumptions we carry around in our heads, can be wrong. There’s a lot of things we believe just becasue we believe them, but I don’t think that’s a very reliable way to get a true picture of the world that you can then act upon. I guess you could say the inherent structure of my mind is to question the inherent structure of my mind.
“I find it interesting that many rationalists care deeply about other people also being rational. Why care, except that in rationality we see justice, truth, hope – i.e. the experience of meaning?”
I don’t know whether I would call myself a rationalist, but I’d say the value of others acting rationally is that their behavior becomes more predictable and reliable. That makes my life easier.
And Chutney, I had composed this answer before I saw your piece. Maybe some things in there I’d want to respond to, but I’ll have to take a look. At the very least, I’m glad you’re not trying to label anyone “reductionist,” mainly because I think that term is just another way of saying “I don’t like what you have to say.” Which would be a pathetic way to argue a point.
]]>I’m still rather influenced by Wesley’s “quadrilateral.” Briefly, he says that we have to balance ourselves by looking at Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience. We can probably UU-ize these by making them plural. The “Sources of the Living Tradition” in the Purposes & Principles pretty much do that.
CK also touched on this recently from a different direction in “Help! I’m being reduced.” The gist of it is that we have to take into consideration someone’s own description of their religious experiences and assume they are not crazy or misled. To do less is uncharitable, which is to say unethical.
Mary Midgley also touches on these questions. She frequently accuses popular science types of reductionism, which for her means trying to make human questions into a single rationality or line of reasoning. But we pack animals are more complex than that. She draws pretty heavily on Aristotle’s four causes, though she’s not stuck on them. Pop materialists prefer to ignore formal and final causes. (And reciprocal causes, a fifth cause?)
I’m veering off topic now, and I’m not accusing you of being a reductionist. I agree with you on the metaphysics, anatta and all that, but we cannot retreat to metaphysics. The Taoist in me wants to say that metaphysical questions are ultimately unanswerable, even the Buddha’s.
We humans are pack animals that are troubled by belonging to multiple, overlapping, and competing packs. We are “rational dependent animals,” as Alistair MacIntyre has argued. Which is to say that both you and Louis are right, in different spheres.
Sorry for all the philosophical name dropping. This discussion is helping me synthesize some reading.
]]>The basis of all moral argument is a belief in our connectedness. If you do not belief that we are somehow connected, then the only thing you can appeal to is rational self-preservation.
But the strange thing is, you don’t have to prove to most people that they ought to be moral. They know it already. Most people do not wait for philosphers to finish their arguments before they decide how to behave.
What’s more interesting than what we can prove with reason and science is the way we can experience a world full of meaning. And we don’t have to prove that this meaning is “out there” to experience it. The meaning is built into us, probably by our biology, but who cares where it comes from? What’s more interesting is learning to live a life that honors that meaning, which means that we find truth not just outside ourselves in the material world, but inside of ourselves in the inherent structure of our minds and what we care about.
I find it interesting that many rationalists care deeply about other people also being rational. Why care, except that in rationality we see justice, truth, hope – i.e. the experience of meaning?
]]>Sense experience and reasoning are hardly foolproof, but I’m more willing to rely on them than I am on wishing, hoping, and feeling. The former methods at least give me somewhat reliable information on the fact of the matter; the latter methods have no bearing on it whatsoever. You may be capable of believing any old thing you like, but I am not.
With “inherent worth and dignity” this is particularly tricky. It is an assertion with moral weight. Presumably, we are not saying “Every person has inherent worth and dignity…so there you go!” Nor are we saying “Every person has inherent worth and dignity…so rape, loot, and pillage to your heart’s content.” No, asserting the inherent worth and dignity of all people *implies* moral obligations that follow logically from it. That’s how we’re built as a species.
But if you base the moral obligation on the premise of inherent worth and dignity AND you can’t PROVE the premise THEN it’s possible to reject the moral obligation as well if you reject the premise. But we WANT people to act morally, or at least I do. So what I’m saying is, regardless of whether we can PROVE that inherent worth and dignity exist (I think they don’t) we should ACT as if they do. I hate to echo Kant, but there you go.
I don’t really care if you believe in the inherent worth and dignity of all. I sure as heck DO care if you act like you do. Put another way, I would like you to treat me as having worth and dignity even though I am nothing but a big water-filled meat baloon. And so I’m more comfortable saying that these qualities exist because we assert them (“I claim this land for Spain!”) than by trying to convince someone that they have objective validity.
]]>Why would I have to prove that something has an objective and material existence before I believe in it?
What is the big boogie monster that makes us cling to only things we can prove and only things that are materially observe, measure, and demonstrate?
]]>Mind you, this might have been the “evangelical bible study” Chutney was afraid would happen. Besides, it can be its own discussion once we’re finished dissecting the other principles. ;)
I might say more later. These daily thunderstorms have been taking it out of me.
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